INTRODUCTION
2011 was the year when young people were portrait in the media as playing a prominent in a series of uprisings -the Arab Spring, the Indignados, and the Occupy movement. This paper does not focus on any of these recent events but addresses earlier uprisings in Eastern Europe and what is now the former Soviet Union in 1989 and during the two decades that followed. The paper lays-out the mixtures of transformation and transition, revolution and regime change, that followed these uprisings, the roles played by young people, and how young people's lives changed and did not change in the aftermaths.
The paper does not aim to give a full account of the causes and consequences of the revolutionary events in 1989. The intention is to identify benchmarks for comparison and to envisage possible longer-term outcomes on young people's lives from the uprisings of 2011. More specifically, we explore how the events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have added to our knowledge about the formation of new political generations, and identify questions that remain to be answered through studying the Arab Spring and its aftermath, which was by far the most spectacular and has become the longest running of the uprisings of 2011.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Political generations
Karl Mannheim (1893 Mannheim ( -1947 is best known as a founder of the sociology of knowledge, but he also became and continues to be the start-point for discussions about political generations (see Mannheim, 1952) . Reflecting on his own experience in Europe between the world wars, Mannheim argued that new political generations were formed in times of major historical change, when upcoming cohorts found that the policies and thinking of existing political elites were simply not in accord with their own experiences and views of the world. Mannheim believed that every cohort was influenced profoundly, with lasting effects, by events and issues that it confronted when first becoming politically aware, that is, typically during youth. These 'formative experiences' allowed them to form a 'generational consciousness -a distinctive pattern of interpreting and influencing the world'. Afterwards they knew whose and which sides they were on and could respond to new events and issues accordingly.
Mannheim argued that in periods of major historical change the upcoming cohort was likely to reject the politics of their elders and become available for recruitment by new political movements, parties or party factions. New political generations were always likely to be divided into different factions by their differing geographical and social locations and actual or potential involvement in social movements and intellectual and cultural currents at the time. Mannheim's main inter-war examples were from the then ascendant communist and fascist movements. In time, he believed that each new generation would replace older political elites and govern its country in a different way. Thus a new political era would dawn which would last until further historical change led to the formation of yet another new political generation.
Post-war generations
Such a new generation was formed in the West after the Second World War, after Mannheim's death. The baby boomers, at that time described as the first members of a postscarcity generation, were the vanguard cohort sharing a post-materialist value orientation (see Inglehart, 1977) . Their arrival in politics was announced in the student movements of the 1960s. Since then, despite regular announcements of the arrival of generations Y, Z, ecstasy, and the internet (see, for example, Milner, 2010; Reynolds, 1999; Wyn and Woodman, 2006) (which have simply been cohorts with distinctive new experiences during their youth) there does not appear to have been a successor political generation in Western countries (see Majima and Savage, 2007) , though the series of movements resisting neo-liberalism that began in the 1980s -Anti-Globalisation, the €1000 Generation, then the Indignado and Occupy movements of 2011 -could signal a new generation's birth.
We know far less about the formation of political generations in Eastern Europe in the mid-20 th century than in the West, but in all the East European countries there must have been generations led by the first cohorts who grew up with no personal experience of any system other than communism. These generations included the builders of communism. They were expected to play the role of transformers of society and creators of the 'new socialist person' (Pilkington, 1994; Wallace and Kovacheva, 1998) and the builders of communism included many true believers. However, there were clearly dissident factions in the countries that became communist after 1945, and in 1989 these factions led the successful 'revolutions from below' in East-Central and South-East Europe. Communism in most Soviet republics was ended differently by 'revolutions from above'. These changes are described in more detail below.
Theoretical developments after Mannheim's work
Subsequent research has confirmed Mannheim's claim that cohorts are profoundly and permanently influenced by issues and events that occur when they are first becoming politically aware (see, for example, Schuman and Corning, 2000) . However, Mannheim's ideas have been built on in several important ways. First, we now know that a cohort's basic political outlook can continue to develop until those concerned are in their 30s (Burnett, 2000) . Second, a new generation may not make its main impact on politics until cohort replacement has made its members into a critical mass of voters and politicians, which may take several decades. Third, the eventual political impact of a new generation will not necessarily be by implementing policies that its members advocated when they were teens and 20-somethings. All political generations necessarily respond to, and may revise earlier ideas in the political, economic and ideological circumstances that prevail when the generation achieves political power. The baby boomers in Western Europe benefitted from the full employment, strong and steady economic growth, rising living standards and the welfare states that were created after the Second World War, but the relevant policies were implemented by members of the generation formed between the world wars, when young people were being attracted into communist and fascist movements. The baby boomers were the source of the student radicals of the 1960s, but as a mature political generation they became the authors of neo-liberal politics. Thus we should not expect current cohorts of young people, whether in Eastern or Western Europe or the Arab countries, if they form and mature as new political generations, to act on what they sincerely believe today.
TYPOLOGY OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE
In order to understand the historical events that led to the collapse of communism in East Central Europe and the former Soviet Republics and whether they played the role of 'crystallizing agents' for the formation of a new political generation it is necessary to examine how the revolutionary changes unfolded and what social transformations were instigated. In the turmoil of 1989 and the mass protests spreading to the states in Central Asia we distinguish three types of revolutionary events: the 'velvet' revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 or soon after, the changes in Serbia and the Western Balkans, and the 'colour revolutions' and other uprisings after 2000. These are divided on the basis of the character of the regime downfall (peaceful or violent) and the character and extent of the wider social changes that followed the shift of power.
The terms 'velvet' or 'gentle' used for naming the revolutions in East Central Europe indicate the non-violent character of the mass protest actions that led to the breakdown of the communist system. Although there were human lives lost in some of the events, the protests that were named after different flowers and colours in some of the former Soviet Union member-countries were also basically non-violent. In the former Yugoslavia republics in the Balkans the changes followed bloody wars and NATO military interference although the aim of the latter was to push out Serbian army out of Bosnia and then Kosovo rather than to oust the Serbian dictator in power. If we follow Theda Scocpol (1979) in understanding social revolutions as rapid, fundamental transformations of the political and economic institutions of a society and of its class structure, a result of class based revolts from below (p. 4), then it is only the 1989 social upheaval that meets this definition. According to Scocpol, in a social revolution political and social changes are mutually reinforcing in transforming the dominant social order and with it the lives of all citizens of the country. The other mass mobilisations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2000 and beyond are better defined as a regime change which constitutes a change in the political institutions, often only a replacement of an autocratic leader, but this power shift is not accompanied by a wider substantial change in the social structure and economy.
The Velvet Revolutions
The events of 1989 were unexpected: neither social researchers, nor the international community, nor even the leaders of the change movements in Central and Eastern Europe, anticipated the enormity of the changes that were to occur between June and December 1989. The events of that year suddenly transformed the futures ahead of the youth of 1989. All subsequent cohorts of young people have experienced a youth life stage that would have been very different had the events of '89 not occurred. Young people today in East-Central Europe include children of the youth of '89. For today's youth, the conditions in which they live are simply normal: 1989 and what their countries were like before then are history, learnt about from elders, teachers, books and other media.
The televised fall of the Berlin Wall amid street partying (on the Western side) was the iconic event of 1989. The fall of the Wall was iconic, especially for those who remembered it being built, but it was neither the beginning nor the end of the history-making events of 1989. It was not decisive, and it was certainly not among the trigger events. These had occurred months before, to the east of the German Democratic Republic, in Poland.
In 1980 a 'free' trade union, Solidarity, had been formed in Poland, and it refused to die or even go underground despite the imposition of martial law and the imprisonment of its leaders. The eventual triumph of Solidarity became more likely following changes in its more powerful Eastern neighbour, the USSR. During the early-1980s there were several changes of leadership in the Soviet Union following the death of Leonid Brezhnev in 1982. He was succeeded by Yuri Andropov, who died in 1984 and was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko who died in 1985. At that time the mortality rate among Soviet leaders was spectacular. A younger leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, assumed office in 1985. He was evidently a different kind of communist from any leader previously encountered. Gorbachev believed that he was reforming communism with his policies of glasnost (freedom of expression) and perestroika (restructuring). He believed that facing real competition in elections would pressure communist elites to become more effective, and hence more popular. Gorbachev let it be known that in the event of the regimes in Soviet satellite countries losing popular support, the Soviet army would not sustain them.
This message was supposed to re-energise the regimes, and communism. It certainly created a new context in Poland. All the leaders of Solidarity were released from internment in 1986, and in February 1989 Solidarity was involved in roundtable discussions with the Polish communists. The outcome was agreement that there would be free elections later that year. These elections were held on June 4
th . There were no trustworthy opinion polls ahead of these elections whose outcome surprised everyone: Solidarity won all but one of the seats in the Sejm that were up for election. Thereafter the Polish communists abdicated, and during autumn 1989 they reconstituted themselves as social democrats. By the end of June Poland had a Solidarity government and was no longer communist. This demonstrated that change was possible. June 4 th was the true history-making date in Europe in 1989. After then the 'dominoes' started to tumble.
Hungary's communist regime had already begun market reforms, and small profit-seeking businesses were operating openly and legally in the late-1980s. On August 23 rd 1989 Hungary opened its western border, meaning that it allowed citizens of communist countries to pass through without exit visas. This led to the Trabant exodus. East Germans began loading as many possessions as the cars would carry, then motoring through Czechoslovakia into Hungary then into Austria and from there into the Federal Republic of Germany. August 23 rd 1989 is the date when the Berlin Wall, and the physical barrier along the entire border between the Federal and Democratic German republics, was decisively breached. On September 4 th there was a massive street demonstration in Leipzig against the communist regime. This was followed by similar demonstrations in other East German cities, culminating on November 9 th when East Germany began to permit free movement through the Wall itself. The partying on and around the Wall, and the Wall's partial destruction, were from the western side. By then Hungary was officially post-communist. Soon afterwards Civic Forum was organising sustained street demonstrations in Prague and before Christmas a dissident playwright, Vaclev Havel, had become Czechoslovakia's first post-communist president.. On November 10 th Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov, the longest serving leader of a Soviet bloc country (36 years), was peacefully ousted from the state and party leadership freeing the public space for mass demonstrations and roundtable talks leading to the adoption of a new constitution. The year ended with the only violent revolution of 1989 when the Ceausescus were summarily tried and executed in Bucharest on the Western Christmas Day. The tide of change continued, but at a slower pace. The first free elections in East Germany were in March 1990, a unification treaty was signed in May, and unification was accomplished in October. In June 1990 there were free elections in Bulgaria.
The 'Singing Revolutions' in the Baltic States were also part of the 1989 transformation wave in Eastern Europe. These were a series of mass demonstrations in 1987-1991 claiming the restoration of the countries' independence from the Soviet Union. Mostly peaceful, they were ignited by singing national songs and religious hymns at music festivals in the region. The spontaneous mass singing demonstrations allowed many issues previously hidden by the Soviet authorities to be raised publicly and contributed to a wide spread dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime and to claims for national sovereignty. The most spectacular act was the 600 km long human chain on 23 rd August 1989 that linked the three Baltic capitals of Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn. These symbolic actions acted to 'bind individuals together' and served as vehicles of 'formative tendencies' and 'integrative attitudes' allowing the protestors to identify with 'a set of collective strivings, if we use Mannheim's terminology again (1952: 305) .
The collective strife for freedom in the Baltic States grew into more confrontational protests until, on December 26 th 1991, the Soviet Union was formally disbanded. The former Soviet republics Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were also claiming independence. The other members of the USSR had independence thrust upon them when Russia quit the union. This followed an attempted coup against Gorbachev by Soviet generals who were seeking to prevent the further collapse of the system that they had been trained to defend. The attempted coup failed when Boris Yeltsin, then President of the Russian Federation, led a mass street demonstration and confronted the tanks in Moscow. Yeltsin subsequently denounced Gorbachev as an ineffective reformer, brought an end to the Soviet Union and thereby eliminated Gorbachev's position and power base in the Soviet Communist Party. In March 1992 Albania's communists were defeated in elections. This was the last of what can be described as velvet revolutions, and on January 1 st 1993 the Czech Republic and Slovakia completed their 'velvet divorce'.
The 1989 revolutionary events had some important characteristics in common: those outside the USSR, and also those in the Baltic States, were true revolutions, instigated from below, by the people, which led to radical political, economic and social transformations of the countries, and remarkably they were all accomplished peacefully.
Transitions in Serbia and the Western Balkans
Change proved most protracted, and bloody, in Yugoslavia, which was surprising in so far as pre-1989 Yugoslavia was the communist state that was most open to and involved in Western systems, but underlines the extent to which nationalism rather than enthusiasm for market reforms was the driving force in 1989 and subsequently. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in June 1991, followed by Macedonia in September the same year, then Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 1992. There was prolonged fighting between Croatians and Serbs in Croatia, and between Croatians, Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia. By the time that military action ceased in these republics (following international intervention in Bosnia), Kosovo had become an issue. A Kosovo Liberation Army, which won the support of the West, was pressing for independence, and was under attack from Yugoslavia (Serb) forces. By 1999 NATO was bombing Serbia, and Kosovo became a de facto NATO protectorate. The contested elections in the remaining state of Yugoslavia on September 24 2000 led to demonstrations and a general strike. The nearly half a million strong protest demonstration in Belgrade on October 5 th brought the sole classic revolutionary scene in the entire chain of events since 1989 with the storming of the parliament building in Belgrade which was set ablaze. These events were named the Bulldozer Revolution after the use of an engineering vehicle against the RTS building, the Serbian State Radio and Television, which was considered a symbol of Milosevic's rule. What followed was the ousting of the autocratic president and the full break-up of Yugoslavia which was completed with the formal independence of Montenegro (June 2006) and Kosovo (February 2008) .
The revolutionary events in the former Yugoslavia are often viewed as a continuation of the democratization wave that started in 1989 and spread to Asia and other East European countries after 2000 (Thompson and Kuntz, 2004; Vejvoda, 2009) . Nevertheless, these events have some specific features that separate them from the rest. The crackdown of the authoritarian regime and the surrender of the Serbian dictator on October 6 2000 came after four wars and two NATO military operations against Serbia in 1995 and 1999. Chauvinism and appeals to ethnic solidarity were a much stronger force for the Yugoslav breakdown than in the gentle revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe 10 years before. The civic protests which challenged Milosevic's regime throughout the 1990s were met by much harsher responses from the authorities including mass arrests, conscription and harassment of activists and assassinations of political figures of the opposition after the NATO bombing campaign in the spring of 1999. Protestors, despite their growing numbers, became successful only when key personalities from the secret police, the army and paramilitary formations withdrew their support for the regime. The social change that followed involved a slow process of democratization which was not quick to spread in other domains of public life.
The Colour Revolutions
The revolutionary events in Serbia in 2000 are often projected as trend-setting for the 'Colour Revolutions' in some post-Soviet states in the mid-2000s with elections acting as the trigger for mass protests (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006; Baev, 2011) . The name comes from the fact that most of these civic protests used a specific colour or flower in their symbolic interpretative frames. Although similar to the 'Velvet Revolution' in Czechoslovakia and the 'Gentle Revolutions' elsewhere in Eastern Europe in their largely peaceful character, the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004-05) , the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005) and the mobilisations in other former Soviet Republics were significantly different in many important ways. The revolts in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the new Eastern Europe were narrowly political in nature, linked to disputed elections, insisting on freer and fairer elections, and leading to the replacement of autocratic leaders but not to radical social transformations. Quite often an authoritarian regime was replaced by a quasi-democratic or equally autocratic one and resulted in no major economic or social restructuring.
Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution of 2005 followed just one year after, but should really be considered separately from the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. All three revolutions were against allegedly corrupt regimes which had massaged election results, but the Kyrgyzstan revolution was not the work young people so much as replacing a president from the north with one from the south of the republic, and lives were lost during the confrontations in Bishkek to which demonstrators from the south had travelled. There was a further revolution in Kyrgyzstan when more lives were lost in 2010 when a president from the north was elected. This was followed by communal violence in the south between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in which several hundred (mainly Uzbeks) were killed and thousands fled (temporarily) across the border into Uzbekistan. This was a repetition of the communal violence that had erupted in 1991 when the Soviet Union disbanded. Many young people were involved in these events, but the events were not led or instigated by young people, and the main confrontations were not between generations.
Subsequent mobilisations
End of story? Almost certainly not. Neither the Velvet, nor the Colour Revolutions nor the revolutions in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010 can be heralded as having put an end to social change in the respective countries. In Bulgaria mass protests and student occupations of university buildings continued well into the first half of the 1990s and street demonstrations and road blockades toppled the governments in office in 1997 and 2013. Civic campaigns in the second half of the 1990s against Vladimír Mečiar's government in Slovakia finally led to his defeat at the 1998 elections. Rallies and occupations of public buildings in a series of antigovernment protests shook Hungary in 2006, triggered by a pre-Wikileak scandal caused by the release of the Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány's speech in which he confessed that his Party had lied to win the 2006 election. In Slovenia in 2012 protests erupted in Maribor and then spread to other cities and towns in 2013 accusing members of the political elite of corruption and demanding their resignation and prosecution. In Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout 2013 young mothers, unemployed youth and disaffected citizens protested against widespread poverty, political stalemate and high level corruption. The civic unrest turned violent in the February-March 2014 when angry workers in Tuzla and other cities joined the demonstrations against dubious privatization deals setting government offices on fire.
In the North and South Caucasus there are sometimes frozen, but always liable to become hot, conflicts. Russo-phile Transdniester remains de facto separate from the rest of Moldova. The destinies of Belarus and Ukraine remain unclear. In 2014 Ukraine became the site of sustained and bloody demonstrations in Kiev. These demonstrations in Kiev had begun in November 2013 when President Yanukovych rejected a trade deal offered by the EU in preference for a deal with Moscow which offered financial aid and gas at favourable prices. The initial demonstrators were pro-EU Kiev residents and students. Later they were joined by Ukrainian nationalist groups from the west of the country, demanding that President Yanukovych and his government stand down. On February 20 th and 21 st 2014 the demonstration in Kiev turned violent. Security forces are alleged to have been fired on by armed demonstrators. The instruction to snipers within the security forces may have been to target snipers from within the crowds, but the firing was clearly less discriminate and by the end of February 21 there had been over 80 deaths. During February 22 the bulk of Yanokovych's security forces melted away and the president fled the capital, eventually to Moscow. The Ukraine parliament voted to strip Yanukovych of the presidency, assigned the Speaker as interim president, then appointed a new government which was recognised by the EU but not by Moscow. During March 2014 there were pro-Russia demonstrations in Crimea, leading to a referendum on March 17 th in which over 90% of those who voted supported Crimea joining the Russian Federation, to which Russia's Duma assented on March 19
th . Subsequently there were proRussia demonstrations and occupations of some government buildings in towns and cities in East Ukraine, and somewhat fewer and smaller pro-Ukraine demonstrations. Violence continued in towns in the east of the country well into the summer of 2014 despite the presidential election held on May 25, and the peace plan followed by a ceasefire with proRussia paramilitaries declared by Poroshchenko, the newly elected president. On June 27 the leaders of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova signed association agreements with the EU in Brussels.
Nation-building is still tentative in all the new (post-1991) multi-ethnic independent states in the region. Market reforms and multi-party political systems have probably become secure in countries that have already joined the EU, but Mongolia and Ukraine remain the only exSoviet republics (apart from the Baltic states, which are now EU members, and Moldova where the president is elected by the parliament) where a president has lost office as a result of defeat in an election.
The main actors in the recent mass mobilizations were not the youth of 2013 and 2014, but these actors had been young people earlier in their own lives. In 2013 and 2014 they were responding to situations that had arisen at that time, but most likely with political orientations that had been formed during earlier critical events, very likely events that had occurred when they were young, possibly around 1989-1991.
YOUTH REVOLTS?
We know little about young people and their political culture in East-Central Europe in 1989. This is because the events of that year were unanticipated. Had they been forecast with confidence, we can be sure that young people's attitudes and involvement would have been monitored before, during and after. There were few studies of young people in the years immediately following 1989. Youth research institutes in Eastern Europe at that time were crippled by shrunken budgets, and some simply disappeared along with other communist state and party apparatuses. We know that there were plenty of young people on the streets, taking part in demonstrations, partying around the Wall in West Berlin on November 9 th and in Wenceslas Square throughout the autumn of 1989. Young people were singing in support of independence in the Baltic States in 1990 and 1991, rock dancing in Slovakia in the summer of 1998, and marching in Belgrade under the slogan Otpor in 2000. Youth groups were very visible in the first two colour revolutions, in Kmara in Georgia and Pora in Ukraine. There were less successful but comparable youth movements in Belarus (Zubr), and Yokh in Azerbaijan. In 1989 young activists were prominent in calls for a change of leadership in Armenia in order to prosecute the war with Azerbaijan more effectively (the Soviet era leaders were eventually replaced by a Karabakh Committee). The links between youth protests including cultural inspiration, political encouragement, and activist training prompted analysts to speak about the formation of a transnational movement in the former Soviet Republics (Beachain and Polese, 2010; Bunce and Wolchik, 2006) .
The colourfulness of young protestors' symbolic actions in public spaces -singing, graffiti drawing, staging comic scenes caricaturing political leaders -succeeded in winning high media attention. The television broadcasts from one country to the next provided inspiration for young protestors evoking ideological frames and protest tactics. The power of young people's symbolic gestures was multiplied by the mass media often making them more effective in influencing public opinion than mass rallies and party membership (Wallace and Kovacheva, 1998) . However, these were not true youth revolutions. The squares of '89 were boiling with mixed crowds -young and old dissidents, actors and workers, politically determined, freedom aspiring and just curious citizens. The main instigators of the political changes in 1989 were from the class of '68 rather than the class of '89, and before long nearly all the young activists had become inactive: they had gone back to their schools or their jobs (if they had jobs) and to their homes, pre-occupied by coping with the new rigours of everyday life, and simply survival in some cases.
The opponents of the revolutionary events in the region often explain the revolts in terms of foreign stimulation and support, presenting them as attempts by the Western powers to expand their sphere of influence. The US administration as well as other national governments, various international organisations and individuals such as the American millionaire of Hungarian origin, George Soros with his Open Society Foundation, or the Professor of Political Science and founder of the Albert Einstein Institutions Gene Sharp, have been accused of planning, directing and funding the protests to serve Western geopolitical interests. For example the mobilisation of youth during the Colour Revolutions has been defined by Russian and Chinese analysts as 'revised tactics for subordination' (see Wilson 2009 ). The focus of criticism on young activists as proponents of foreign influence was also apparent during the student protests against Milosevic in Serbia (Jennings 2009).
Such interpretations are based on assumptions that young people lack experience and knowledge and are easily manipulated in politics (See Wallace and Kovacheva 1998).
Examining external variables in the social transformations since 1989 is not the aim of this paper. It will suffice to say that they included a wide array of forms: direct funding for civil society organisations, provision of equipment and goods, consulting, training and polling, media assistance, and in the case of Serbia, economic and trade, diplomatic and legal sanctions and military intervention. Such aid provided opportunities to be used by the insurgents but had a negative impact as well when used by the authorities to create public mistrust toward protest leaders and civic participation more generally. Yet the often pointed at Western influence was not the only foreign factor playing a role in the revolutionary events. Very significant in all the types of revolutions in the region was a process called diffusion (Bunce and Wolchik 2006) of protest ideas, tactics and institutions from the revolt in one country to the mobilisation in another.
The external donors might have supplied some necessary resources in the struggle for democracy, exploited more or less successfully by the activists in the campaigns but the internal structural causes of the revolutions and the masses that pressed the autocratic governments to step down were the most important factors in the events of 1989 and later. Their weakness vis-à-vis the strongholds of autocratic power is the decisive reason for the failure of mobilisations in other countries in the region such as the protests in Belarus in 2006 against President Lukashenko ('jeans revolution') or those in Moldova in 2009 ('grape revolution').
CHANGE AFTER 1989 AS EXPERIENCED BY YOUNG PEOPLE
Intergenerational disparities
Twenty-five years after the gentle revolutions in East Central Europe, huge intergenerational differences in knowledge and experiences are evident. The class of '89 and its predecessors may always judge the present using communism as a benchmark. For them, all postcommunist political regimes will have earned some merit simply by being not communist. The events of 1989 demonstrated how narrow and shallow genuine support for the old system had been in East-Central Europe. However, the class of '89 and its immediate successors will have been the last cohorts to be able to use personal experience of life under communism as a yardstick. These cohorts' youth life stage transitions were caught-up in the whirlwind of change that followed the collapse of the old system, whereas by the mid-1990s there were already cohorts of school-leavers who had never engaged personally with any wider society in which people did not have a choice of political parties, from which it was impossible to travel to the West, where one was not surrounded every day by consumer advertising, and where it was necessary to search and compete for jobs. None of this has been new and exciting for them. It has been just mundane normality (see Markowitz, 2000 , for evidence from Russia).
The countries have continued to change, but much more slowly than in the early-1990s. The changes will be hardly perceptible for young people in today's Eastern Europe.
There are historical parallels. The post-scarcity cohorts who grew up in the West after the Second World War took full employment and progressively rising standards of living for granted. It was only their elders who had lived through the 'hungry 1930s' and the subsequent war who experienced the post-war conditions as improvement (see Inglehart, 1977 ). Today's young East Europeans have cognitive knowledge of communism and few would choose to restore the system even if this was possible (Flere et al, 2014; Mitev and Kovacheva, 2014) , but their benchmarks in appraising their own lives are more likely to be the lives of their parents, from here-on the class of '89 and its successors, and conditions in other countries of which they have some experience, and these other countries are now likely to include pre-2004 EU member states.
Differences within and between post-communist countries have widened since 1989. Until then they all had basically the same communist education, economic and political systems, and their citizens led a common socialist way of life. Differences were widening throughout the 1990s and have since been consolidated. This applies to differences between and within countries. Career groups that were formed in the new labour markets in the 1990s have been developing into new social classes. Political processes and cultures have stabilised.
Labour markets and economic cultures
Some members of older age groups survived the shock-therapy of the early-1990s without damage to their lifestyles or life chances. Some exemplary communists were reborn as good capitalists. However, far more lives were damaged beyond repair as enterprises closed, up to 50 percent was ripped from living standards and savings were decimated by hyper-inflation. Status earned under the old system was lost. The real value of retirement pensions shrank alarmingly. Dismay and anger were likely to be directed at the countries' new political leaders. People said that the communists had at least been serious politicians. The short-term outcomes of the revolutions of 1989 were not what most of those who had supported change had either hoped for or expected, though many expressed willingness to make sacrifices if, in the long-term, their children and grandchildren would benefit (Roberts and Jung, 1995) . Yet in the short-term elders were often distressed by young people's uses of their new freedoms. Elders knew that it had become more difficult to obtain employment than when they were young. Young people's plights attracted sympathy, but many of their elders were confused and dismayed. They were alarmed at how town and city centres and neighbourhoods had become unsafe with unsupervised groups of young men (and somewhat fewer young women) just hanging about. Young people were often accused of having 'no values' (Riordan et al, 1995) and their apparent materialism was deplored -their willingness, it often appeared, to do whatever was necessary to make money then spend it ostentatiously (Magun, 1996; Saarnit, 1998; Zuev, 1997 ).
As explained above, the revolutions of 1989 were not instigated by young people. The young simply joined in the demonstrations and celebrations. The leaders were from the classes of '68, not '89. Poland's Solidarity was led by a middle-aged electrician. Czechoslovakia's Civic Forum was led by an ageing playwright. The first democratically elected president in Bulgaria in 1990 was a philosopher known for his sam-izdat publications during communism. It has become easy to forget that the aims of the change movements did not include dismantling welfare states in the name of reform or selling enterprises to foreigners (subsequently called foreign direct investment). People celebrating in the streets of Eastern Europe in 1989-90 were expecting not less but better social protection, health care and education (Ferge, 1997; Kovacheva, 2000) . The change movements were not pro-capitalism. Rather, they sought moral rejuvenation, national liberation and real socialism -countries run fairly by and for their own citizens. In Poland there were hopes that the newly independent, overwhelmingly Roman Catholic country would re-moralise a decadent Europe. Materialistic young people were betraying such hopes. Researchers were speaking of 'generational inversion' (Mitev, 1998) -the young tended to accept reality and act pragmatically, the old craved for unfulfilled high ideals.
In practice, young people's mind-sets were more complex than the condemnation suggested.
The top values of the majority were family followed by friends. Many depended on these relationships for food and housing, chances to earn money, or, as some put it, simply to survive the 1990s (see Roberts et al, 2000) . Most left school or college with a strong desire to obtain employment that corresponded with their specialties -the occupations for which they had been educated and trained. Ideally, young people wanted to work with and earn respect for their skills and knowledge. Many of those with vocational and university education adopted a 'waiting attitude', staying unemployed while supported by their parents or willing to 'do anything' to earn money in the hope that, once their countries' transitions were over, there would be plenty of jobs corresponding to their qualifications and aspirations (Roberts et al, 1999; Kovacheva, 2001 ).
Social inequalities
That said, money had become more important than formerly, and everyone in Eastern Europe realised this. Income inequalities were widening. Under communism it had been difficult to spend the money that one earned. The system systematically bred shortages. It was an economy of queues and waiting lists. In the new market economies anything could be bought, more or less immediately, provided one was able to pay, and consumer advertising was ubiquitous. It was also the case that, in the early-1990s, 'business' was the new glamour career. Young people were excited by the prospect of working for themselves, developing businesses and, as a result, becoming wealthy. Most made some effort to do business. In most cases this meant trading -sometimes just on local streets, but sometimes more adventurously by shuttling across country borders. Cigarettes were the most common merchandise. Sex trade (briefly) flourished becoming a status occupation in certain sub-cultures. Meanwhile, some women (again briefly) celebrated their new freedom to 'live normally' as full-time housewives. Everywhere there was an increased pressure to retreat to more traditional gender roles presented as an 'expansion of choices' (Kovacheva, 2010; Stoilova, 2012) .
However, it was not young people's own preferences but circumstances dictated by economic restructuring and labour market processes that shaped the careers of the 'pragmatic' young East Europeans in the 1990s. The reforms divided them into three broad career groups.
 First, there were those who obtained jobs soon after completing their full-time education then remained continuously and fully employed, though not necessarily in the same jobs or with the same employers. Members of this group were usually well educated and from privileged family backgrounds, with jobs in the state sector or in Western-linked businesses, or self-employed, or working in substantial private businesses, often family owned.  The second group became long-term unemployed. These were typically young people graduating secondary schools without vocational qualifications and the rising group of early school-leavers, mostly from disadvantaged and often ethnic minority family backgrounds, living in deprived, often rural areas or in one-industry towns where the main enterprise had closed.  The third group, the largest in many places, can be described as under-employed.
Their experiences were diverse, but located them somewhere between the fully employed and the straight-forward unemployed. Some practised 'survival selfemployment'. Some of these, and others who had an employer, were in and then out of work, then in work again. Their jobs were often unofficial, without a contract, and officially or de facto temporary. The work could be seasonal, in agriculture or tourismlinked. Many of the jobs were part-time, or nominally full-time jobs which paid less than a proper full-time salary. The new private sectors were the source of most of this employment. Commerce was faster to open shops, bars and restaurants than to revive coal mines and steel mills.
Anyone who has been involved continuously in youth research in Eastern Europe since 1989 will have encountered a series of surprises. An attraction of the field has been that findings have been difficult to predict. One surprise has been the speed with which upcoming cohorts experienced their new, post-1989 circumstances as simply normal while researchers were still grappling to understand this new normality. A further surprise has been how labour markets and terms and conditions in different types of employment have changed, and the ways in which they have not changed, since the mid-1990s. It then seemed reasonable to expect that as the economies recovered from shock-therapy, then grew continuously and strongly from yearto-year (as happened in most of the countries), the fully employed career group would expand while the other career groups contracted and eventually disappeared, thus the main divisions among young workers would be by their types of occupations, as in the West (up to now). The relative sizes of the career groups have always varied from place to place. The fully employed group has invariably been largest in capitals and other major cities. But everywhere the relative sizes of the groups appear to have remained little changed since the mid-1990s (see Roberts et al, 2008) . The benefits of economic growth have led mainly to improvements in the terms and conditions of employment of the fully employed who have developed into their countries' new middle classes. In Russia it is estimated that just a fifth of households have become better-off (often much better-off) than under the old system (National Research University Higher School of Economics and Expert magazine, 2011). The family-household is the unit that is classed for purposes of consumption, and new middle class households' standards and styles of life are typically supported by more than one stream of income. Jobs may be in the public or the private sector. Public sector salaries have recovered since the early-1990s. Other middle class incomes are from self-employment in substantial and enduring private businesses Pollock, 2009, 2011b) .
Today, members of the class of '89 include members of the first generation of new middle class parents, and they typically adopt strategic approaches to their own children's education. They ensure that their children attend good nurseries, elementary then secondary schools. Private education is most likely to be used selectively, depending on whether standards at public schools are considered satisfactory. Formal schooling is usually supplemented with private coaching at crucial stages, like preparation for university entrance examinations. Parents ensure that their children acquire useful skills including competence with ICT and foreign languages. The parents invariably expect their children to progress through higher education, and possibly to gain some experience in a foreign (invariably Western) country. They will always use the 'connections' that they, as middle class parents, possess to open doors for their children (see Kovacheva, 2006; Tomanovic, 2012) .
New aspirations
The new middle classes are minorities of the populations in all East European countries (Tilkidziev, 1998) but everywhere this has become the new class of aspiration. The workers' state is no more. The working classes have been demoted and degraded. Young people today do not prioritise business or employment in a specialty. Rather, they aim for the middle class.
Where expansion has been unregulated, swollen higher education systems flood the labour markets with graduate middle class wannabes. Those who are unable to obtain middle class employment and achieve middle class lifestyles at home have two options. They can migrate in search of the Western way of life. This traffic continues, usually still intended as pendulum migration in the first instance, though those concerned may eventually become part of longterm diaspora. Westward migration is now much easier (it is legal) for young people from post-2004 EU member states, and there are now cross-border networks of friends and relatives to facilitate the flows. The alternative is to stay at home and wait for the arrival of the great global market economy (see Roberts et al, 2005) .
By the end of the 1990s ex-communist countries were much more different from one another than had been the case in 1989. National cultures -histories, languages, literatures etc -had been revived and were being transmitted in education. In some cases national histories that had been interrupted by communism had been resumed. There were huge differences in the extent to which countries' economies had recovered. Generally, it had proved an advantage to be preparing for membership of the EU, and preferably to be located next to the border of the pre-2004 EU. East-Central European countries have now regained their pre-Second World War position as middle Europe, at the very heart of Europe. Slovenia, with a population of under two million, nestling next to Italy and Austria, has been an exceptional success story. Countries with natural resources, especially oil and gas, for which global demand has been strong and rising, have been able to benefit. Resources that could have benefitted the entire Soviet population have benefitted mainly Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan. Oil and gas are the reasons why salaries are now four times higher in Kazakhstan than in its Central Asian neighbours, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
Differences within countries have widened. Capital cities are always exceptional in the opportunities in their labour markets. These are always the main centres of government employment, entertainment and retailing, the most likely bases for the headquarters of major businesses of all kinds, and where international NGOs and foreign delegations are based.
Outside the capitals the countries have new economic wastelands -rural regions where agriculture has been privatised and all the factories that communism opened have closed, and single industry towns where the single industry stopped or downscaled dramatically as soon as communism ended (for examples, see Roberts et al, 2005) . Other towns have boomed following inward investment that has revived a car or domestic appliances plant, for example. Young people's job prospects now depend greatly on exactly where they happen to live.
THE NEW POLITICAL GENERATION
Most members of the class of '89 can have played no direct part in the momentous events of that year. Unless they were at university or lived in capitals or other major cities, they are unlikely to have taken to the streets at any stage. We know that for many families the changes simply happened, maybe with their tacit approval, while they continued with their lives as best they could in their homes, workplaces and schools (see Roberts, 2012) .
It is impossible to offer any reliable estimate of the proportion of young people who became involved in any political activity during 1989, but there was confidence at the time that the advent of 'true' democracy would lead to an upsurge and a broader blossoming of civil societies in all the East European countries. Young people would have a choice of political parties. They would be able to speak their minds and associate freely. Above all, they would be able to participate in rebuilding their countries thereby building their own lives while helping to make history. A surprise for researchers was that the expected high level of interest and active engagement in politics did not happen which prompted some to speak about 'the strange death of civil society' (see Lomax, 1997) and the fruitless attempts to build a 'civil society without citizens ' (Mihailov, 2004) . Perhaps it is more accurate to say that subsequent political activity by young people has not been in the ways that were expected -joining and becoming active members of the political parties that contest elections.
Nearly all those who were on the streets in 1989 soon joined those who had remained throughout in their homes, schools and workplaces, and most have remained politically inactive ever since except during short-lived explosions of protest some of which have led to regime change (see below). Most young people have known how they want their postcommunist countries to develop. They have been virtually unanimous. They admire the West -its democratic politics and its standards of living. These are the kinds of societies that they want their own countries to become. In the early-1990s the youth of Eastern Europe were the continent's most enthusiastic Europeans, eager for their countries to become full members of the EU (see, for example, Kovacheva, 1995; Mitev, 1998; Niznik and Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 1992) . Membership of the EU and other Western-based international organisations has had their overwhelming support, and all post-communist leaders in Eastern Europe (west of Ukraine) have endorsed these goals. The problem for their citizens, young and old, has been the slow (if any) pace of change in their own lives. It took very little time for young voters to grow disillusioned with their new post-communist political elites. The context was the big problem: the countries' economies imploded and living standards fell alarmingly. Politicians rapidly became figures of ridicule and contempt. Hence, before long, the return of excommunists to power in some of the countries. Young people were unimpressed by the squabbling of politicians in democratically elected assemblies. They soon became suspicious of politicians' real motives, especially when politicians' lifestyles were grossly out-of-line with their official salaries. By the mid-1990s most young people felt that most politicians were in politics to serve their own interests rather than to serve their countries (Mitev, 2005; Roberts, 2009; Roberts et al, 2000) .
Young people in Eastern Europe are not politically apathetic. Most have strong opinions, but these typically include contempt for all politicians and a determination to remain personally disengaged from formal politics while seeking private solutions to their own problems using private resources. Attitudinal surveys in the region show a continuing dislike of organised activities but a growing inclination to get involved in less structured and more informal networks and friendship circles on ecological, educational or consumer issues (Hoikalla, 2009; Kovacheva, 2005; Spannring et at, 2008) . The strong opinions that young people express sometimes appear contradictory. They will say that they are pro-democracy then almost in the next breath argue that their country really needs a strong political leader. The most popular and trusted politicians in the ex-Soviet Union include some of the most authoritarian presidents (see Dafflon, 2009; Lillis, 2010a Lillis, , 2010b Roberts and Pollock, 2011a) .
The atypical young people who have joined political parties since 1989 are an important group not on account of their size, which is tiny, but because they have been slowly replenishing their countries' political elites. These are now composed of mixtures of pre-and post-1989 entrants to politics. In Hungary the group of university students that formed the anti-communist Alliance of Young Democrats in 1988 soon became part of the new political elite, changed their political orientation from liberal to conservative and won the country's parliamentary election in 1998. Most young political activists in Eastern Europe since 1989, as under communism, have not been just enthusiastic supporters but have been at least interested in the possibility of building political careers. This has not necessarily meant becoming an elected politician, the first step towards which has been inclusion on a party's list of candidates. From this position there have been good chances of election to a parliamentary assembly where the party has a chance of gaining a share of power. However, a political career can also be built by joining the 'new nomenklatura', that is, the class of political appointees. These positions may be in public administration, a public service or a business in which a government has a stake. Activists whose roles in their parties become known can soon find themselves being approached by members of the public seeking assistance from politicians in registering a business, solving a tax problem, obtaining a health and safety or fire certificate, permission to build or whatever. There has been an understanding that any such assistance will not be provided without compensation. Such arrangements may operate on a long-term basis, and these arrangements (of which many citizens or members of their families have some personal experience) corroborate suspicions that the countries' entire political classes are corrupt. Whichever party they belong to, and whether they are young or old, they are all politicians. Throughout Eastern Europe the initial new recruits to politics after 1989 were more likely to have been nurtured in the communist parties than anywhere else (for example, see Zhuk, 2010) . Where else might they have obtained appropriate experience?
Voters in countries that have joined the EU can use their votes to dismiss their governments and promote different parties and politicians into power, but, they ask, what difference does this make? There appears to be just an exchange of positions within the same political class. In countries that have opted for so-called managed democracy (or had this imposed from above) protestors have taken to the streets enraged by the alleged falsification of election results (further evidence, if any was needed, of the corruption of politics). However, all the colour revolutions were actually triggered by splits within the countries' political classes. The usurpers were current or former insiders. After the revolutions politics continued as before (the business of the political classes), and young people returned to their families, schools or jobs (as in 1989) and soon recovered their anger. Actually it is difficult to eliminate vote rigging in countries where public officials who run elections believe that their jobs depend on the re-election of the incumbent, and that their career prospects depend on demonstrating impressive support in the cities, towns or districts for which they are responsible. The colour revolutions were not true revolutions as had occurred between 1989 and 1991. Subsequent successful uprisings have led merely to regime change.
CONCLUSIONS
The uniqueness of the Velvet Revolutions
The revolutions of 1989 have features that are still unique. There had been and still have been no other transformations or transitions from communism instigated 'from below'. Prior to 1989, the official view was that the countries were heading towards a golden age of true communism which would be global, when scarcity would end, and states could wither away. Unofficially researchers thought that change could come either from the outside (Zhelev, 1982) or with the slow formation of a new elite (Konrad and Szeleni, 1979; Zaslavskaya and Rivkina, 1991) . Despite the opening up during Russia's 'perestroika' when numerous misdoings of the communist regimes became widely known, the feared or desired total transformation was not foreseen anywhere or by anyone to be as near as the late-1980s. The system came to an abrupt end in 1989 in Eastern Europe through challenges from within, from below, by the people. These changes had overwhelming support from, but they were not instigated by the youth of 1989. The leaders' aim was national liberation rather than the wholesale dismantling of socialism. Joining a global market economy became the sole option open to the new governments when their countries' economies collapsed. This goal certainly had the support of young people for whom it meant the Western (or more specifically American) way of life flooding into their countries. Their aim was not to become part of Europe. The countries were already in Europe, as was Russia.
The events of 1991 in the USSR (the Baltic states and the South Caucasus apart) were revolutions from above, the result of splits in the communist elites. Old rulers were not usually replaced by newcomers to power. The exceptions were the Baltic states and Georgia whose first president following independence (Gamsakhurdia) was from outside the old communist elite, but he was replaced by the end of 1992 by Shevarnadze, a former USSR foreign minister. Young people were not especially prominent when the ex-Soviet republics celebrated independence in 1991.
It was different in the later mobilisations that led to the toppling of Milosevic in Belgrade in 2000 and the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004/05, but in each of these cases the outcome is better described as regime change rather than a revolution or transformation. By the end of the 1990s all the ex-communist countries' new cohorts of young people (who had become politically aware under post-communism) were thoroughly disillusioned by the performances of their countries' 'democratic' politicians, many of whom had managed to become part of their countries' new rich, and young people were frustrated that, rather than enjoying the Western way of life (by then, assumed to have been the aim of the change movements in 1989), their living standards were typically inferior to those that their families had experienced under communism. The youth mobilisations of [2003] [2004] [2005] which led to regime change in Georgia and Ukraine, but not in Belarus or Azerbaijan, had more in common with subsequent mobilisations of Western youth and in the Arab Spring than was the case in 1989, though digital technologies played no part in any of the mobilisations in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR up to this point. We must also note that the rebellions in Belgrade, Tbilisi, Kiev (and Bishkek) rallied behind leaders who until recently had been part of the regimes that they were challenging.
A further point to note is that these later outbreaks of rage subsided just as rapidly as the youth of 1989 had returned to their homes, schools and jobs. This did not mean that their anger at the failure of 'reform' to deliver Western standards of living, or their feeling that politicians were endemically corrupt, had subsided. The predominant feeling among youth in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR remains that neither the market economy nor democracy are yet working properly. Unlike some participants in the Arab Spring, the Indignados and the Occupy movements, they have not sought alternative forms of an economy or versions of democracy suited to the digital age.
Implications and questions for future research
Questions that remain to be addressed in further research are: what are the similarities and differences in the roles that young people played in the revolutions and mass protests in The analysis in this paper allows us to draw lessons to consider when answering these questions:
First, future studies of challenges to incumbent regimes need to exercise caution before describing these events as youth revolts or, if successful, revolutions by the young. Even if young people have an over-riding presence in the demonstrations in squares and in front of parliaments and presidential buildings that topple regimes or produce reforms, investigators need to explore whether these final events were outcomes of prior steps and whether young people were the original instigators.
Second, while youth movements may often act as 'the gateway' to great social transformations (Leccardi and Feixa, 1989) , researchers need to be sensitive to the possibility, indeed the likelihood, that the outcomes of revolutions may not correspond with the change movements' original aims. This sensitivity is essential because all parties who have been involved at all stages in the changes will have vested interests in claiming that the changes are what they sought all along.
Third, it is unlikely ever to be the case that all young people participate in change-making events. It is unlikely that young people are ever unanimous in seeking change rather than preferring stability, or, if changes happen, their preferred outcomes. Everywhere young people are divided by gender, location, class origins, education, class destinations (anticipated or achieved), ethnicity and religion. Which divisions are especially significant will vary by time and place. It is always necessary to ask exactly which young people took part in particular actions and sought specific outcomes.
Fourth, the outcomes of any changes are unlikely ever to be the same for all categories of young people. Outcomes will always be filtered through some combination of the divisions listed above.
Fifth, when studying the formation of a new generation and the differences in values and activities between societal generations, researchers should not overlook the family as a unit of integration and continuity. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia young protesters opposing the old regimes and elites were tolerant and supportive of their parents in the home, and viceversa, even when the views of the generations differed. Informal family networks played a role before and after the revolutions providing young people with support and options that had otherwise been closed by the political and economic changes.
Sixth, it is useful to study the role of mass media in opening political opportunities for youth mobilisation. While in the Velvet Revolutions there was radio (e.g. Radio Free Europe) and television broadcasting, protest events later and most prominently in the Arab Spring occurred in the era of social networking sites. Social media in today's mobilisations ease the creation of agreed symbolic frames of meaning of the events, as well as the trans-nationalisation of interpretative frames and protest actions.
Seventh, researchers must be sensitive to the fact that by 2014 there will be young people who have become politically aware and active post-2011 and for whom the events of that year are history that was made and experienced by others. Very rapidly these young people will swell in number.
Finally, we must recall that 1989 would not have happened without Gorbachev whose reforms were intended to revitalise and boost support for communism. This did not happen. Poland's communists were humiliated on June 4 th 1989 then simply abdicated in other East-Central European countries. Elsewhere, most notably in North Africa and other Arab states, and probably in Ukraine during 2013 and 2014, we have seen more recently that events that signal the awakening of a new political generation may simultaneously re-activate older generations.
The SAHWA Project ("Researching Arab Mediterranean Youth: Towards a New Social Contract") is a FP-7 interdisciplinary cooperative research project led by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and funded by the European Commission. It brings together fifteen partners from Europe and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries to research youth prospects and perspectives in a context of multiple social, economic and political transitions in five Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon). The project expands over 2014-2016 and has a total budget of €3.1 million. The thematic axis around which the project will revolve are education, employment and social inclusion, political mobilization and participation, culture and values, international migration and mobility, gender, comparative experiences in other transition contexts and public policies and international cooperation.
